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Abstract 
Yes. By using real-time structure break monitoring techniques we find evidence against monotonic 
response pattern, specifically three response structures of US stock market to the federal monetary 
policy actions based on a sample from 1989-2010. We re-estimate the market response in each of the 
three structures and find results stronger than previously documented especially in 2001-2008. We 
propose a “FedGap” variable which measures the deviation of Fed policy from the “Taylor Rule” in 
explanation and find it to be significant with economic meaning. We conclude that market responses 
proportionally to the size of the FedGap and it thus serves as a new “macro-state” factor which can 
explain the dynamic response patterns of financial markets. We also examine the issue from the bond 
market, and find similar results. 
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1. Introduction
Monetary policy action is defined by the response of the markets and both industry and regu-
lators seek a deeper understanding of this relationship2. A vast literature on the theories and
econometric methods used to describe the relationship between monetary policy actions and
financial market reactions, especially in the stock markets, is established. A standard event
study methodology, such as the Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) method3, requires the collec-
tion of every single Federal funds rate announcement or action of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) with their corresponding stock market reactions, then performing a
linear regression to quantitatively analyze monetary policy’s impact on the stock market.
An implicit assumption in this approach is that responses in the sample are homogeneous.
However, this assumption of homogeneity is hard to be satisfied for long duration samples as
there would have structural changes in the response pattern due to time-varying economic
and market conditions. As a consequence, any examination of market responses to policy
actions should account for possible “pattern breaks” to allow for multiple structures instead
of a single pattern. This is the first motivation of this study.
Despite the importance, very few researches have considered this issue before. Among those
few works, Guo (2004) documents a state-dependent effect of monetary policy on stock prices
of different firm sizes. Small stocks were found to be more sensitive to the Federal Reserve’s
monetary policy than big stocks in the sample of late 1970s, but this relationship disappeared
in the sample of 1990s.4 Demiralp and Jorda` (2004), who perform the Bai and Perron (1998)
test for structural breaks on the regression in Kuttner (2001) to examine possible changes
in response patterns in the bond markets. From February 4th, 1994, the Federal Reserve
changed their practice to one of publicly announcing federal funds rate changes immediately
after every FOMC meeting, possibly leading to a change in the market response pattern.
Their results supported the hypothesis that there is a structural break around February 4th,
1994 and that the FOMC schedules allow markets to better anticipate the timing and the
nature of future policy moves since then.
Although the work of Demiralp and Jorda` (2004) is in the same spirit of our motivation,
their test is retrospective as the Bai and Perron (1998) test for structural breaks is a one-off
2For example, regulators must consider potential market responses when setting monetary policy, and
then monitor the market response to the policy in real time, measuring the effects of the policy action and
preparing for any needed modification. Good regulation practice requires that policy action be accurate
and effective while also considering such details as the wording and timing of the announcement. Gukaynak
et al. (2005) study the role of FOMC statements wording and find that it could effectively affect public
expectation.
3Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) conclude that an unexpected 25-basis-point rate cut would typically lead
to an increase in stock prices of around 1%. By including the policy surprise variable in the framework of
Campbell and Ammer (1993), they find that the impact of monetary policy surprises on stock prices comes
either through expected future excess returns or expected future dividends.
4This is attributed to the credit channel of monetary transmission and the corresponding fact that in
the late 1970s, the business conditions were typically bad, and in the 1990s, the business conditions were
typically good. A more direct reason was that firms relied more on debt in the late 1970s than in the 1990s.
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historical test for structural change. As we seek to pin down the time-varying structure
of market responses in real time, we employ the real-time structural change monitoring
technique proposed by Chu et al. (1996) in the current study. Compared with traditional
retrospective tests, it overcomes the problem noted by Robbins (1970) that repeated usage
of retrospective tests as new observations arise makes the probability of rejecting a true null
hypothesis of no change approaching one, and has a very promising size control performance.
Further, with a real-time monitoring technique, we can obtain information regarding market
reactions in real time rather than retrospectively. It is important for the timely evaluation
of every policy action. This is the second motivation of this study.
By focusing on Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), we apply the real time monitoring methodol-
ogy of Chu et al. (1996) in examining the relationship between monetary policy actions and
financial market responses with an updated sample period from June 5th, 1989 to December
31st, 2009, covering 189 events of FOMC announcements or actions. The monitoring proce-
dure reports that the events at April 18th, 2001 and January 22nd, 2008 are 2 break points.
Therefore, they naturally divide the total data set into 3 sub-samples. The results clearly
show that there exists different response patterns which are confirmative to our intuitions.
We re-estimate the response relationship in the 3 sub-samples respectively and find that
compared to the results in other two sub-samples as well as Bernanke and Kuttner (2005),
the stock market responses to the monetary policy extremely significant in the second sub-
sample (April 18th, 2001 to January 22nd, 2008).
To interpret the possible factors which could explain the changing patterns of market re-
sponses, we follow the methodologies of two recent works, Basistha and Kurov (2008) for the
business cycle, and Jansen and Tsai (2010) for bull or bear market conditions. By replicating
their approaches with our extended sample, we find that the conclusions of the two works
are no longer valid. We find that the response pattern or structure identified in our study
can span both bullish and bearish market conditions and we argue that this indicates that
the market response pattern may not be totally subject to market conditions. Although
this sounds counterintuitive, we further argue that the underlying explanation is that dur-
ing the extended sample period, the Fed dramatically deviated from its former policy rules
and that this could affect the originally valid response pattern. As discussed by Calomiris
(2009), with respect to monetary policy, the Fed has a “dual mandate” and should vary the
supply of its liabilities to achieve a balance between its two ultimate objectives: maximizing
price stability and minimizing cyclical fluctuations in unemployment. One way to balance
these two objectives is described by the classical “Taylor Rule”. However, the Fed departed
dramatically from the Taylor Rule from 2001 to 2008. Calomiris (2009) argues that subse-
quently the Fed’s objectives with respect to price stability and unemployment are hard to
discern or characterize through any rule as everything seems to have taken a back seat to the
immediate objective of limiting short-term financial sector fallout by setting the Fed funds
rate to zero and announcing various guarantees or quantitative targets for the purchase or
support of various categories of private securities. This makes it extremely hard to predict
monetary policy, or to hold the Fed accountable to achieving its unannounced and hence,
unobservable goals. This may provide evidence that the Fed changed and altered people’s
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belief toward it.
We supply evidence by empirical examination with a constructed new explanation variable,
“FedGap” (a measure we proposed of how much Fed deviates from the classical Taylor Rule),
which is significant in the explanation of the change of market response patterns. Such re-
sults indicate that in addition to those factors discussed in the literature, the change of Fed’s
goal is also a factor which can have dramatic impact on the response pattern of financial
markets to policy actions. We also apply the same procedure to the U.S. Bond market and
find similar results.
The contributions of our work are manifold. First, this paper re-examines the relationship
between monetary policy actions and markets’ responses with an updated larger sample.
The results show that structural breaks exist, implying that the estimation results of some
previous research are biased with homogeneous assumptions. We identify the structural
break points in real time and obtain a greater understanding of the interaction. Second, we
demonstrate that a real-time monitoring technique is a valuable tool for studies of financial
market regulation. Finally, we document some new evidence which sheds light on the re-
thinking of the determination of the market response pattern as well as the role of the Fed
in any response structural change.
We organize the paper as follows: Section 2 discusses the real-time monitoring methodology
and data processing procedure; Section 3 presents empirical results obtained from an exam-
ination of the stock market; Section 4 provides further interpretation of the results; Section
5 discusses these results based on an examination of the U.S. Treasury bond market; and we
conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Methodology and Data
2.1. Real-time monitoring methodology
To avoid the intrinsic problem of retrospective monitoring tests as mentioned before, we
propose the real-time monitoring procedure/methodology introduced by Chu et al. (1996).
Most tests for structural breaks are retrospective tests, i.e., given a set of observations, those
tests decide if a break has occurred within the time span of the data5. Repeated applications
of retrospective test could lead to rejection probability of the null hypothesis of no break
approaching one ,even there is no break, when new observations become available and grow
(Robbins 1970). Therefore, in contrast to the classical one-shot tests to detect a structural
break within the data span, Chu et al. (1996) suggest an online procedure to monitor struc-
tural breaks that has the actual size close to the nominal size. The basic framework of the
real time monitoring procedure are as follows. As described in Chu et al. (1996), given an
initial fixed training sample of size m, the monitoring scheme needs a stopping device, deter-
mined by a detecting statistics (detector), Zn, and a boundary function, g(n/m), to monitor
5See e.g., Andrews (1993), Incln and Tiao (1994).
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whether the breaks occur after the data being increased to n(n ≥ m). More precisely, under
the null hypothesis of no break, Zn may cross a boundary function g(n/m), for some n ≥ m,
with certain probability, say 0.05 or 0.10. On the other hand, if a break indeed occurs, we
expect Zn to cross g(n/m) with a large probability. Operationally, the null hypothesis is
rejected when Zn ≥ g(n/m) for some n ≥ m. Otherwise, the monitoring process keeps on
running until a break is observed.
As a matter of fact, two detectors are considered in Chu et al. (1996), the cumulative
sum(CUSUM) of recursive residuals and the parameter fluctuations (FL). Since the CUM-
SUM of recursive residuals detector could lead to the weakness of power((Ploberger et al.
(1989)), we only consider FL detector in our paper. Suppose the regression as Yt = X
′
tβt+εt,
Chu et al. (1996) define a fluctuation detector by Zˆn = nD
−1/2
m (βˆn − βˆm), where Dm =
M−1m V0M
−1
m , Mm is O(1), and uniformly positive definite such that m
−1∑m
t=1 XtX
′
t−Mm p→
0. The crucial idea of this FL detector is the deviation of the updated parameter estimate βˆn
from the historical parameter estimate βˆm. Chu et al. (1996) also assume that the following
multivariate FCLT (Functional Central Limit Theorem) holds:
xmλ = m
−1/2D−1/2m
( [mλ]∑
t=1
xtx
′
t
/
[mλ]
)−1 [mλ]∑
t=1
Xtεt ⇒ w(λ), λ ∈ [1,∞) (1)
Where
(i) {Xtεt} obeys a FCLT with V0 = limm→∞m−1E
[(∑m
t=1 Xtεt
)(∑m
t=1Xtεt
)′]
positively
definite;
(ii) m−1/2Z¯[mλ] ⇒ w(x)− λw(1) = W 0(λ), λ ∈ [1,∞).
W
0
(λ) is a K-dimensional Brownian Bridge. They further suggest the following stopping
boundary:
g(n/m) = m−1/2
(n−m
m
)[( n
n−m
)[
a2 + ln
( n
n−m
)]]1/2
(2)
And the parameter a2 controls the crossing probability of the FL detector under the null
hypothesis of no break (H0). For example, when a
2 = 7.78 and 6.25, the preceding crossing
probability is 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. As shown previously, H0 is rejected when |Zˆn| ≥
g(n/m) for some n > m, otherwise, the monitoring process keeps running until the opposite
is observed. On the other hand, once a break has been detected, we rerun the monitoring
procedure for the rest samples to detect possible second break point. The whole process
stops when the size of the left samples is smaller than that of the training sample, say m.
2.2. Data processing procedure
A full understanding of market reactions requires us to determine to what degree a policy
is anticipated by the market, that is, to quantify the expected and unexpected component
of each action. Kuttner (2001) proposes a market-based technique to solve this problem.
By utilizing the Fed funds futures, the unexpected component of every policy action can be
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constructed from the change in the futures contract price on the announcement day relative
to one day prior. Specifically,
∆iut =
D
D − d(f
0
t,d − f 0t,d−1) (3)
Where ∆iu is the unexpected target rate change. Suppose there is a FOMC policy action
on day d of month t. f 0t,d is the futures rate, which equals to 100 minus the current-month
“30-day Fed Funds Futures” contract settlement price. The superscript 0 means the contract
is the one will expire at the end of month m, and 1 represents the one that will expire in
the next month, analogically. There is a scaling factor in the formula, D
D−d in which D is
the number of days in month t. This is necessary because the official specification of the
“30-day Fed Funds Futures” contract’s daily settlement is based on the average daily Fed
Funds overnight rate for the delivery month, rather than the rate on any specific day. If the
event happens on the first day of month m, then f 1t−1,d is used instead of f
0
t,d−1. If the event
happens on one of the last 3 days of month t, the formula ∆iu = f 1t,d− f 1t,d−1 is used, so that
the effect of any month-end noise in the effective Federal funds rate is minimized6.
Thus, the expected component can be derived as actual rate change minus surprise as in
Equation (4).
∆iet = ∆it −∆iut (4)
Besides separating the FOMC Fed funds rate , event window selection is also important for
capturing the picture of a policy shock to financial markets. In February 1994, the Federal
Reserve started the practice of an explicit announcement of the Fed funds rate decision after
FOMC meetings. Usually, the announcement is at 2:15 p.m. EST, when the Fed funds
futures market in the CBOT and the stock markets are not yet closed. Therefore, the policy
action is reflected in the closing prices of futures contracts and the CRSP broad index. The
date of event is simply the date of the policy announcement. However, before February 1994
there was no explicit announcement so the new Fed funds target rate was only known by
investors when the Fed funds market opened the next day. Following Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005), we solve this problem by assigning most dates of events as the day following policy
decisions7.
6See Kuttner (2001) for more details.
7There are three exceptions. The first is December 18th, 1990, when the Fed announced a 50 basis points
cut in the discount rate at 3:30 p.m., after the close of the futures market. This was correctly inferred as
a 25 basis points cut in the Fed funds rate by the market. The difference between the closing futures rate
on December 18th and the opening rate on December 19th is used to measure the surprise. The second is
October 15th , 1998, when a 25 basis points cut was announced at 3:15 p.m. The difference between the
closing futures rate on October 15th and the opening rate on October 16th is used to measure surprise. The
last one occurred on October 8th , 2008, when a joint statement by Federal Reserve and other seven central
banks around the globe was issued at 7:00 a.m. EST. We do not make any adjustment because there is no
time mismatching between the stock markets and the futures market and the 1 day price differences of the
two markets adequately catches the policy shock.
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Based on an event-study perspective, we collect FOMC Fed funds rate decisions and the
corresponding 1 day broad stock index returns of those dates (CRSP value weighted). For
the purpose of this paper, the events are defined as scheduled FOMC meetings (no matter
whether there is a target rate change or not) and unscheduled FOMC meetings with target
rate change decisions. The full sample ranges from June 1989 through to December 2009. As
the CBOT launched the market of 30-day Fed funds futures in 1989, the first observation is
on June 5th,1989. Altogether, the sample contains 189 observations. Studies like Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005) and Boyd et al. (2005) show that the 1-day market response to monetary
policy announcements is contaminated if the unemployment report of the BLS is released on
the same day. Since we aim at detecting possible structure breaks in response patterns, and
such multiple news releases may contribute to market response, we keep them in the sample
to reflect the maximum observations for study. Our subsequent findings are qualitatively
indifferent, even when excluding them. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our
sample.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables
All 1st 2nd 3rd
Obs. 189 116 55 18
µRt 0.368 0.256 0.341 0.357
σRt 1.179 0.902 1.328 1.834
µ∆iet -0.015 0.004 -0.013 -0.141
σ∆iet 0.197 0.153 0.225 0.295
µ∆iut -0.031 -0.033 -0.017 -0.061
σ∆iut 0.103 0.093 0.086 0.183
µFedGap -0.933 -0.177 -2.096 -1.931
σFedGap 1.646 1.113 1.332 2.524
Note: µ denotes the mean value and is in percentage, σ denotes the standard deviation. Rt refers to event-
day response, ∆iet and ∆i
u
t refers to the expected and unexpected component of the Fed policy action,
respectively. 1st refers to the first subsample period from 1989 - 2001, 2nd refers to sample period 2001-2008,
3rd covers sample period from 2008-2010. FedGap refers to the deviation of Federal monetary policies from
the Taylor Rule, which is a proxy proposed in the current study for measuring role change of the Fed.
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Real-time Structure Break Testing for Stock Market Reaction
We use the real time monitoring test to detect the potential structural change of the re-
gression relationship of monetary policy announcement and market response described by
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)’s specification. Ht is the 1-day return of CRSP value weighted
index on event days. ∆iet and ∆i
u
t are the same as symbols in the methodology description.
Ht = a+ b
e∆iet + b
u∆iut + εt (5)
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Figure 1: Real-Time Structure Break Tests for CRSP Value Weighted Index’s Responses to FOMC An-
nouncements (1989-2010) (m=50)
Note: In this figure, the solid line represents the real time response detector and the dashed line and dot
line represent 5% and 10% significance level of the boundary functions which is established for real time
monitoring of the structure change. The horizontal-axis represents the time points after the training window
(m=50 here) and the vertical-axis represents the FL detector statistics.
The result is presented in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, the solid line represents the real-time response detector and the dashed line
and dot line represent 5% and 10% significance levels of the boundary functions which is
established for real time monitoring of the structure change. The results clearly demonstrate
that there is a historical period that the detector cross the boundary and the break point is at
the event of April 18th, 2001. After the first break point has been detected, we rerun the same
procedure by using another 50 observations since April 18th, 2001 as the training sample,
and the second point is detected at January 22nd, 2008. The whole sample is then naturally
divided into three subsamples. Hence, there are two new relationships between Federal
Reserve policy actions and market responses in contrast with the historical relationship of
1989-2001. We conclude that more than one response pattern exists and that, as far as we
know, this is the first time a study has documented the exact structure changing periods.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Structure Break Points with Setting of Training Sample Size
Note: This figure describes the distribution of break points detected with the different setting of m, which
ranges from 41 to 56. The horizontal axis in the figure is m, the vertical axis is the location of the detected
break.
Reassuringly, the evidence of structural change is very robust. It remains regardless of the m
value or whether the estimation method of V0 is either Robinson (1998)’s long term variance
method or OLS. Figure 2 presents a more complete view of the full spectrum of detection
results. It describes the distribution of break points detected with the different setting of
m, the training sample size, which ranges from 41 to 56. The horizontal axis in the figure is
m, the vertical axis is the location of the detected break. From Figure 2, it is clear that the
location of the first break point is robust, and only when m equals 51, 52 or 53, the break
locates one event earlier (Mar 20th, 2001). Further, the location detected for the second
point (January 22nd, 2008) is even more robust compared to the first break point. We also
believe the result of m = 54 is an outlier. Thus, we take the points detected at April 18th,
2001 and January 22nd, 2008 as the robust locations of response patterns switching.
The events that the unemployment report of BLS release in the same day (as the FOMC
announcement) are mainly distributed in the training periods (first 50 observations). As we
mentioned before, there is a probability that our break-detecting results are potentially biased
by the contamination of the impact to markets from the unemployment report releases. We
therefore kick out all the events that unemployment report is released at the same day as
the Fed announcements and run this monitoring procedure again. And we can obtain almost
identical result as before, which leads us to believe unemployment report release does not
9
adversely impact our finding8.
3.2. Stock Market Response in Different Structures
Using the break points detected above, we can re-estimate the stock market responses within
each subsample. Following previous literature, we present our empirical results estimated
by OLS with White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the standard errors together
with the WLS method.
Table 2: Stock Market Responses to FOMC Announcements in Different Subsamples (structures)
Sample Obs Est. Intercept Expected Surprise R¯
2
all 189 OLSW 0.30*** -0.57 -2.06 0.036
(0.08) (0.75) (1.61)
1st 116 OLSW 0.14* 1.25** -3.78** 0.135
(0.09) (0.54) (1.75)
2nd 55 OLSW 0.20 0.18 -8.85*** 0.321
(0.13) (0.30) (1.21)
3rd 18 OLSW 0.94** -2.82* 3.02** 0.257
(0.40) (1.52) (1.06)
B&K(2005) 131 OLSW 0.12 1.04** -4.68*** 0.171
(0.09) (0.48) (1.57)
Note: OLSW refers to OLS with White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the standard errors.
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
It is clearly shown in Table 2 that the coefficients estimated is quite different across sub-
samples. On the factor of surprise, the coefficient in the 1st subsample is -3.78, but changes
to -8.85 in the 2nd subsample, which is more than doubled with even significant t-statistics.
That means, the market response is more significant, and the investors are more “responsive
to Feds monetary policy announcements and policy actions. It is also notable that the coef-
ficient of the expected term is significant in the first sample period whereas insignificant in
the second one. Meanwhile, the adjusted R2 is much larger in the second sub-sample than
that in the 1st sub-sample. As there is a break point within the sample period in Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005), our results suggest that their model has more powerful explanatory
ability and more consistent with the theory in the second period. In the 3rd subsample, the
coefficient of surprise is positive and not statistically significant. We believe that this is due
to the randomness caused by small sample problem, since there is only 18 events in that pe-
riod. Because of there exists three different patterns, the explanation power of the Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005) in regression including all the observations has been weakened, further
indicating that the structural breaks need to be considered. The findings clearly show that
there exists multiple response patterns, which confirms our intuition and argument before.
8Results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3: Estimating Responses with Pattern Dummy Variables
Est. α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 R¯
2
OLSW 0.30*** -0.57 -2.06 - - - - - 0.036
(0.08) (0.75) (1.61)
OLSW 0.13 1.30 -4.51*** 0.07 0.85** -1.13 -3.49** -4.12** 7.90*** 0.200
(0.09) (0.54) (1.66) (0.16) (0.40) (0.82) (1.67) (3.38) (2.04)
Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In order to further illustrate the response patterns, we run the explanatory regression again
by differentiating subsamples using dummy variables as following:
Rt =α + β1∆i
e
t + β2∆i
u
t + β3D
1
t + β4D
2
t + β5∆i
e
tD
1
t
+ β6∆i
e
tD
2
t + β7∆i
u
tD
1
t + β8∆i
u
tD
2
t + εt
(6)
Where D1t is set to be 1 when the event is in the 2
nd subsample and 0 otherwise. Ana-
logically, D2t = 1 when the event is in the 3
rd subsample. ∆iutD
2
t = ∆i
u
t × D2t is the cross
term proposed with the aim to capture potential structural change in the market reaction
to surprise. ∆ietD
2
t = ∆i
e
t ×D2t is also included in the regression in case there exists breaks
in the market reaction to expected target rate change. We report the regression results in
Table 3.
The significance of the coefficients from the regressions vividly characterize the dynamic of
the multiple response patterns in the historical period. We can see once controlling for the
patterns with dummy variables, the coefficient before the surprise term (β2) is significant.
In the period of the second subsample, the coefficient is about 2 times of the first subsample
in terms of magnitude(-4.51 plus -4.12, compared with -4.51). We can also obtain that the
insignificance of the coefficient on the surprise target rate change as shown in Table 2 for
the whole sample is mainly contributed by the observations in the 3rd subsample, since it
is significant with a positive coefficient while it is negative in 1st and 2nd subsample. In
addition, the adjusted R2 improves a lot, more than 16%.
Generally speaking, the U.S. and the world economies enjoyed relatively stable growth dur-
ing our sample period before the sub-prime crisis. Beneath this peaceful surface, one may
wonder, what could produce the detected three structural changes in financial market reac-
tion? Why are the break points located on April 18th, 2001 and January 22th, 2008? And
why does the market become more sensitive during the 2nd subsample?
The answers are complicated by the CRSP Value Weighted Index having both a significant
response and a relatively weak response to the FOMC announcements, which are defined
by the structural break points detected above. One natural explanation would be that the
market changes the way it processes information. But rational expectation theories demand
that decision making be based on available information. This kind of response structure
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switching can also be attributed to external factors other than the market itself or possibly
the market’s own time-varying properties. In other words, there exists possibility that the
information itself has changed in nature leading to the structure shifting as a result of the
interaction between two-way information traffic instead of, as most previous studies perceive,
one-way traffic.
Explanations with economic insights by comparing and contrasting the market responses
under different visible conditions were the preferred results of the literature. Indeed, there
are many factors that may change the fundamental aspects of a financial market, such
as the business cycle, bull or bear market conditions, and the status of monetary policy.
However, most relevant economic interpretation provided by previous studies fails to explain
our findings9. For the remainder of this paper, we attribute the cause of the multiple response
patterns to “the Federal Reserve’s role change” and present the logic behind this assertion
and the corresponding evidence. There is rare literature on this topic. Taylor (2009) shows
that the actual interest rate set fell well below what the Taylor rule would suggest policy
should be. Between the end of 2001 and late 2007, U.S. monetary policy greatly deviated
from the Taylor rule. There has been no greater or more persistent deviation of actual Fed
policy since the turbulent days of the 1970s. The structural changes we detected and the
deviation between the target Fed funds rate decisions and the rates the Taylor rule suggests
are almost coincident in location. This inspires us to explore further.
 
Figure 3: Taylor Rule and Federal Fund Target Rates: 1989-2010
Note: This figure depicts the deviations of Federal Reserve monetary policy from the Taylor Rule over the
entire sample period of our study from 1989-2010.
9We delay the presentation of these results in the next subsection.
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Figure 3 clearly depicts the deviations of Federal Reserve monetary policy from the Taylor
Rule over the entire sample period i.e., 1989-2010. We follow Taylor (1993) in calculating
the Taylor Rule value of interest rates. Specifically, the Taylor Rule used in the paper is in
its classic form:
i = 2 + pi + 1/2(pi − 2) + 1/2(q − q∗) (7)
Where pi denotes the inflation rate, and the inflation target is set as 2%. q denotes the
real output while q* denotes the potential real output. We use the change in CPI in the
last quarter and potential GDP as the measure of the inflation rate and the output target,
respectively. The data are obtained from the FRED. Clearly, the Fed monetary policy dra-
matically deviated from the Taylor Rule from 2001 with the gap maintained until around
the end of 2007. Compared to Figures 1 and 2, where we identify the structure breaks in
financial market reactions, it is obvious that the break points we identified with real-time
monitoring techniques coincide with the deviation over time of monetary policy.
We thus believe that the role of the Federal Reserve during 2001 to 2008 was not the same
as in the preceding period; it underwent a role change. The Federal Reserve Act regulated
three key objectives: maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest
rates. The Taylor rule is a simple, and probably a very effective monetary policy rule that
guides a central bank to fulfill these objectives. If we assume that the Taylor rule is how cen-
tral banks realize their objectives, then the Fed’s monetary policy deviation from the Taylor
rule means that the Fed’s role as protector of a stable economy changes10, also changing the
market’s perception of the Fed. Taking the case of the 2001 to 2008 period, for example,
where the U.S. economy is almost completely driven by Fed policy, monetary decisions were
unusually important to the market participants, inducing the market’s automatic response,
even though markets better anticipate policy changes11. This is supported by the current
study, which is based on a real-time monitoring procedure.
To quantify the role deviation of the Federal Reserve, we propose a simple empirical mea-
surement, the “FedGap”. Specifically, the FedGap is the Fed funds target rate set by the
Fed minus the Fed funds rate as the Taylor Rule suggests. The frequency of the FedGap
is quarterly as we wish to have one observation of this measurement for each of the events
in our sample. Thus, we assign the last value of FedGap before the date of that event to
the event. Actually, during the 2008 financial crisis period of our sample, there are some
observations where the Fed funds rate Taylor Rule suggests to be negative however the Fed
funds rate target set by the Fed is in the range of [0, 0.25%]. For expediency, we set them
as zero, and consequently the corresponding FedGap is also equal to zero. This variable is
simple but it is enough to reveal something influential in this study.
In the following section, we show that our reasoning helps explain why the conclusions of
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Jansen and Tsai (2010) on the relationship between the
10See also the discussions in Calomiris (2009).
11see Demiralp and Jorda` (2004) for related discussions.
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market response to Fed announcements and business cycle or bull/bear conditions is inval-
idated with our sample. This demonstrates the importance in relationship descriptions of
the proposed factor.
3.3. Explanation for Pattern Changes
3.3.1. Business Cycle
One natural question following our findings above is how to explain the different response
patterns of structures of the stock market to Federal policy actions. Basistha and Kurov
(2008) study cyclical variations in the effect of Fed policy on the stock market. Based on
3 indicators of the business cycle -NBER announcement, XRIC and CFNAI- they find that
S&P 500 index returns show a much stronger response to unexpected changes in the Fed-
eral funds target rate in the recession and tight credit market conditions of 1990 to 2004.
However, with our updated dataset, we find that their conclusion no longer holds, based
on their original methodology12. We investigate this by applying an explanatory regression
with similar specifications to Basistha and Kurov (2008), or
Rt = α + β1∆i
u
tRMt + β2∆i
u
t (1−RMt) + εt (8)
where RMt is the NBER recession dummy. It equals 1 when the observation is in the
recession period announced by the NBER Business Cycle Committee, and is 0 otherwise.
∆iutRMt = ∆i
u
t ×RMt is the cross-term which captures the responses in the recession period.
Table 4: Explain S&P 500 Index Response Patterns to Monetary Policy Changes with Business Cycle
Sample Obs Est. Intercept Recession(β1) Expansion(β2) β1 − β2 R2
Current study 189 OLSW 0.29*** -0.41 -3.96*** 3.55 0.063
(-0.09) (2.02) (1.74) (2.61)
Basistha & Kurov (2008) 130 OLSW 0.19** -6.69*** -5.01** -1.68 0.188
(0.09) (1.59) (2.00) (2.50)
Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. OLSW is ordinary least square method with White
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The regression results are reported in Table 4. From the table, the estimated responses, as
using OLSW, in expansion periods is about 10 times as much as those in recession periods
and β1 is no longer statistically significant. This is in opposite of the conclusion of Basistha
and Kurov (2008) that markets respond more in recession periods than in expansion peri-
ods. This also challenges our intuition. After further consideration, we believe this result
12Intuitively, our 2nd subsample period of 2001-2008 covers a complete business cycle with most of the
period in expansion
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is due to the existence of multiple response patterns over our full sample period and that
the responses in the 2nd subsample are significantly larger whereas the majority of the 2nd
subsample is in a period of expansion. Thus this increases the responses of the expansionary
period of the whole sample. To testify this, we classify the recession periods and expansion
periods in the 3 subsamples by utilizing a dummy variables regression
Rt = α0 + β0∆i
u
t +
3∑
i=2
{
αeiei,t + β
e
i ∆i
u
t ei,t
}
+
3∑
j=1
{
αrj + β
r
j∆i
u
t rj,t
}
+ εt (9)
We also take possible changes of the intercepts into account. ei,t is set to be 1 if the event
belongs to the expansion period of the i th subsample and 0 otherwise. rj,t analogically
indicates every event in the recession period of j-th subsample, ∆iut rj,t = ∆i
u
t × rj,t repre-
sents the cross term of surprise and dummy variable, to capture the response patterns in the
recession of j-th subsample. ∆iut ei,t = ∆i
u
t × ei,t considers breaks in the expansion period of
the i-th subsample. We take the expansion period of the first subsample as the benchmark.
We report the regression results in Table 5.
Table 5: Estimating Responses in Different Structure Regimes with Dummies for Business Cycles
Est. α0 β0 β
e
2 α
r
1 α
r
2 β
r
2 α
r
3 β
r
3 R¯
2
OLSW 0.26*** -2.15** -8.99*** -0.72** -1.13*** -9.85*** 1.59*** 6.69*** 0.328
(0.08) (0.99) (2.17) (0.31) (0.40) (2.56) (0.30) (1.64)
Note: OLSW is ordinary least square method with White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In economic terms, the insignificance of all the dummy variables can be interpreted as the
response patterns in those periods statistically indifferent from that in the expansion period
of the first subsample. The scenario in the recession of 1st subsample belongs to this group.
However, compared with α0, α
r
1 and α
r
2 reveals intercepts of -0.46 and -0.87 in the recession
of 1st and 2nd subsample, respectively. Given the same negative(positive) surprise, they will
deliver smaller rise(bigger fall) in stock index, even the response patterns in recessions is sta-
tistically indifferent from those in expansions. The different intercept reflects the asymmetric
properties, which is consistent with the multiple response structure observation. In the 2nd
subsample, the coefficient of the monetary surprise in expansion is β0 + β
e
2, which equals to
-11.14. That means a hypothetical 1% unexpected Fed Funds rate cut will lead to about
11% increase in the stock market index. On the other hand, the coefficient of the monetary
surprise in recession is β0 + β
r
2 equals to -12, which is a little bit larger than the expansion
period. This implies Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)’s empirical conclusions are marginal valid
here. Given the results from Table 4, we can argue that their original conclusions can not
help in explaining our findings based on the full sample analysis. But once one accounts for
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multiple response structures the inconsistency can be reasonably explained. The coefficients
for the recession period of the 3rd sample αr3 and β
r
3 are positive, it is counter-intuitive but
it is confirmative with our re-estimation result in the 3rd subsample from Table 2. We also
attribute this to the small sample problem.
3.3.2. Bull/Bear Market
Asymmetries exist widely in financial markets. For example, agents’ behavior in a bull mar-
ket may be different from those in a bear market, and the “good news, bad news” stylized
fact is broadly confirmed in every financial market. The general finding is that the market
reaction is more pronounced in a bear market. Jansen and Tsai (2010) examine asymmetries
in the impact of monetary policy surprises on the stock returns of bull and bear markets
during 1994 and 2005. They concluded that the impact of a surprise policy action in a bear
market, for most industries, is significantly greater than the impact of a surprise monetary
policy in a bull market. They use the technique from Pagan and Sossounov (2003) for sep-
arating bull and bear markets. We follow this approach, use monthly data to identify the
turning points and then switch to daily data to accurately locate the turning points at the
daily level13.
Following the specification of Jansen and Tsai (2010), we examine the relationship between
market response patterns and the bull/bear market states. With the dummy variable iden-
tifying events in the bull market, we then have
Rt = β0 + β1∆f
u
t + β2∆f
u
t × Bullt + εt (10)
where ∆fut is the unexpected target rate change, and Bullt is the dummy variable that la-
bels all the events in bull markets with value 1 and labels 0 otherwise. The results of this
regression appear in Table 6 and exhibit a different story to those of Jansen and Tsai (2010).
Table 6: S&P 500 Index Responses in Bull/Bear Market Conditions from 1989-2010
Sample Obs. Est. β1 β1 + β2
Current Study 189 OLSW -2.99 -1.41
(3.16) (1.18)
Jansen and 100 OLSW -7.7*** -1.4
Tsai (2010) (1.7) (1.6)
Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. WLS is weighted least square method. OLSW is
ordinary least square method with White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
13The testing results show that the market turns bearish between June 4th, 1990 and October 11th, 1990;
February 2nd, 1994 and June 24th, 1994; September 1st, 2000 and October 9th, 2002; and October 10th,
2007 and March 9th, 2009.
16
From Table 6, neither beta is statistically significant, implying that the conclusion of Jansen
and Tsai (2010) does not hold in the updated longer sample. This finding might also relate
to the structural change or multiple response patterns we documented over the long sample.
This can be illustrated more clearly by going one step further and dividing the bull and bear
markets into 3 subsamples using dummy variables. We propose a dummy variable regression
model as follows:
Rt = φ0 + θ0∆f
u
t +
3∑
i=2
{
φBeari Beari,t + θ
Bear
i ∆f
u
t Beari,t
}
+
3∑
j=1
{
φBullj Bullj,t + θ
Bull
j ∆f
u
t Bullj,t
} (11)
Where, Beari,t = 1 if the event is in the bear market of i-th subsample and 0 otherwise. At
the same time, Bulli,t = 1 analogically labels events in the bull market of j-th subsample with
value 1 and 0 otherwise, ∆fut Beari,t = ∆f
u
t ×Beari,t, is the cross term of surprise and dummy
variable,to capture the response patterns in the bear market of i-th subsample.∆fut Bulli,t =
∆fut × Bulli,t considers the bull period of the j-th subsample. In this specification, the bear
market of the first subsample is the benchmark.
We report the refined dummy variable regression result in Table 7.
Table 7: Explaining Responses in Different Structure Regimes with Dummies for Bull/Bear Conditions
φ0 θ0 φ
Bull
1 φ
Bull
2 θ
Bear
2 φ
Bull
3 φ
Bear
3 θ
Bear
3 R¯
2
-0.54*** -1.58 0.84*** 0.95*** -11.84*** 1.41*** 2.28*** 5.96*** 0.23
(0.19) (0.96) (0.22) (0.24) (1.97) (0.41) (0.37) (1.63)
Note: Results obtained using OLSW. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The result shows that the response is the same in the bear market of 1st subsample and the
bull market in the whole sample. The response in the bear market of the 2nd subsample is
negative, large and highly statistically significant and θ0 (the response in the bear market
of the 1st subsample, which also represents 3rd subsample), has a higher value of t-statistics
than β1 in Table 6. It means that Table 7’s result is closer to Jansen and Tsai (2010)’s
original conclusion, though θ0 is still not significant. Furthermore, the market does react
more to “good news” (negative surprise, i.e., more rate cut than expected) and less for “bad
news” in bull markets, since φBull1 , φ
Bull
2 and φ
Bull
3 are all positive and highly significant. This
is consistent with Jansen and Tsai (2010)’s conclusion that the impact of a monetary policy
surprise in a bull market is smaller in magnitude than the impact in a bear market, and is
generally statistically insignificant. This implies Jansen and Tsai (2010)’s empirical results
may probably still holds after the time varying response structure considered and controlled
for.
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3.3.3. Monetary Stance
Monetary policy stance is another possible answer for explaining market responses. Simply
put, easing cycle and contraction cycle are the two main status of the monetary policy. The
period of the 2nd subsample in our study is neatly a complete easing cycle plus a contraction
cycle. Thus, the monetary policy status can not provide enough explanation for our find-
ings14.
4. Further Interpretation
So far, we have illustrated that the explanation for invalidation of previous empirical expla-
nations for market response based on business cycle and bull/bear markets in our extended
sample lies on the observation of the response patterns switching across three structures.
But what is the deeper mechanism beneath?
We attribute it to the role change of the Federal Reserve, i.e. it is the Federal Reserve’s
role change induces the structure breaks which in turn leads to “counterintuitive response”
observations documented in the extended sample. More specifically, we want to determine
whether our FedGap variable proposed can provide any help in explaining the invalidation of
previous conclusions about business cycle and bull/bear. Naturally, we tried to add FedGap
into the specification of Basistha and Kurov (2008) as well as Jansen and Tsai (2010), hoping
to bring the results of the extended sample back to original conclusions. However, the result
shows there is no strong evidence that taking FedGap into account can reanimate Basistha
and Kurov (2008) as well as Jansen and Tsai (2010)’s conclusions15. Actually, this is under-
standable as FedGap can only help explain the difference between periods when there’s large
variation of the variable itself. But, in our 2nd subsample, the FedGap is relatively stable
while there is a recession period and a expansion period, as well as a bearish market and
a bullish market in sequence. FedGap can not help in characterizing the different response
patterns based on existence of both of market conditions in the same structure16.
How then, are we to interpret the influence of the Fed’s role change? We believe that the
FedGap is a state variable that underlies the whole relationship. Just like the response
patterns, the Fed’s role change should also be a variable describing a fundamental state
in which such response pattern studies should be based on. It is reasonable to argue that
14Besides, in Jansen and Tsai (2010), policy announcements are divided into 3 groups: “positive rate
change”, “no rate change” and “rate cut”. The corresponding regression shows a similar result, only “no
rate change” has explanation power. The results of the insignificant coefficients of “positive rate change”
and “rate cut” indicate that the market response pattern in the monetary policy easing cycle is indifferent
from that in the monetary policy contraction cycle.
15 The results are available from the authors upon request.
16Obviously, why previous conclusions fail in our sample is not an omitted variable problem. So, the
right solution is to classify every event in the expansion period (bull market) into 2 groups: events in the
expansion(bull market) of the 2nd subsample and events in the expansion(bull market) of non-2nd subsample,
to isolate the strong response change caused by the Fed role change. This is what we do in the previous 2
subsections.
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different role states determine different response patterns and it is also consistent with our
intuition discussed in the introduction.
In order to show the validity of our arguments, we perform an ordered probit regression with
the specification
yt = β × FedGapt + εt (12)
Where 
yt = 0, if 1
st subsample
yt = 1, if 2
nd subsample
yt = 2, if 3
rd subsample
(13)
The results are presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Ordered Probit Regression for Examining “FedGap” in Explaining CRSP Value Weighted Index’s
Response Pattern Changes
β R¯
2
-0.42*** 0.158
(-6.91)
Note: Z-statistics are shown in parentheses. *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%
levels.
The statistically significant coefficient provides evidence that FedGap matters. β is negative
because the value of FedGap is negative for most of our sample. Given the evidence that the
Fed’s role change has an effect on response patterns, we propose that the Fed’s role change
probably affects the intensity or elasticity of the market responses which is measured by the
coefficient of responses. The regression below provides some supporting evidence for this
proposal. The sensitivity measurement of the market response patterns, gt, is constructed
by dividing the event-day CRSP returns (responses) by the magnitude of the corresponding
surprises17, and we regress it on the FedGap in (14). We exclude these observations with
zero surprises in the examination. Table 9 reports the results.
gt = α + β × FedGapt + εt (14)
The significant positive coefficient of beta is consistent with economic logic (under OLSW,
it is also positive but less significant), as the value of FedGap is negative for most of the
time in our sample while the coefficient of surprise in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) is al-
so negative. The results suggest FedGap is closely related to the surprise-adjusted market
response and directly explains why the market reacts more significantly to the surprise in
our 2nd subsample, in which the magnitudes of FedGap are larger than those in the first
17We define gt to be a surprise-adjusted responses, which is also an empirical proxy for the variation of
response elasticity.
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Table 9: Surprise-adjusted Market Response Patterns and the FedGap
Est. α β R¯
2
OLSW 12.03*** 5.98** 0.033
(4.60) (3.01)
Note: OLSW is OLS with White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the standard errors. Standard
errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
subsample18.
5. Bond Market Responses Structure Changes
We also study U.S. bond markets and compare and contrast the results with those from
the stock market in order to see whether the findings are consistent. The same monitoring
procedure is applied on 1 year treasury bond securities with the maturity of 1 year. The
results19 show that January 3rd, 2001 is the robust first break point which is insensitive to
the choice of m in a reasonable range, which is close to the first break point we detected
the stock market. This clearly suggests that the bond market shares some common reaction
patterns to monetary news with the stock market. This is understandable as bonds have
long been regarded by stock market investors as the best tool for hedging adverse shifts
of economic-wide conditions. In the detection for the second point, the results are not as
robust as the first break point. For m equals and greater than 50, the second point is located
around March 18th, 2008, while for m smaller than 50, there is no break detected. We can
thus conclude that January 3rd , 2001 is a robust structural break point and that March
18th, 2008 is a break which is relative weakly identified. Given the results, we re-estimate
the regression in the two subsamples divided by the break points of January 3rd, 2001.
From Table 10, we see that the bond market has multiple response patterns too. The ex-
planation power of the original Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) model in the first sample is
stronger than that of the second sample. This clearly indicates it is necessary to consid-
er structure changes when examining financial market responses to macroeconomic policy
changes and further confirms that monotonically structured responses patterns should be
rejected and that our real-time techniques for structure break monitoring work effectively in
financial markets. As our work focuses on stock market responses, so we leave discussion of
the effect of any role change of the Federal Reserve in the bond markets as a separate topic
for future work.
18The results in the third subsample is incomparable as there are only 18 observations.
19All the results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 10: Structure Based 1 Year Treasury Bond Market Responses to the Monetary Policy Changes, 1989-
2010
Sample Obs Est. Intercept Expected Surprise R¯
2
all 189 OLSW -0.11 0.82 16.27*** 0.231
(0.25) (2.68) (3.23)
1st 113 OLSW -0.03 -0.01 10.76*** 0.388
(0.12) (0.86) (2.14)
2nd 76 OLSW -0.31 1.43 22.00*** 0.235
(0.49) (3.77) (5.32)
Note: OLSW is OLS with White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the standard errors. Standard
errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
6. Concluding Remarks
Financial market response to macroeconomic news announcements has been a very impor-
tant topic of research in finance for long. Generations of researchers have endeavored to
provide theories and empirical evidences for monitoring, explaining and predicting patterns
of reactions and channels of interactions between markets and regulations. Motivated by the
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) work, we extend their classical event study methodology by
going one step further to discuss real time structure changes of the stock market response
to the FOMC announcements based on an extended sample from 1989-2010. By using real-
time structure break monitoring techniques, we find evidence against monotonic response
pattern, specifically three response structures of US stock market to the federal monetary
policy actions. We then re-estimate the market response in each of the three structures
and find results stronger than previously documented especially in 2001-2008. We propose
a “FedGap” variable which measures the deviation of Fed policy from the “Taylor Rule”
in explanation and find it to be significant with economic meaning. This FedGap can also
explain why previous conclusions on market response to Fed announcements and business
cycle or bull/bear conditions fail in the current study. We further conclude that the FedGap
serves as a new “macro-state” factor which can explain the dynamic response patterns of
financial markets. Similar results are also obtained from the bond markets.
We would like to end this paper with a word from Taylor (2000):
“In macroeconomics there is never only one accepted explanation for any big event—
whether the Great Depression, the Great Inflation, or the Long Boom. By debating alternative
explanations we learn and hopefully improve policy in the future.”
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